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Abstract
We examine the determinants of the dissent in central bank boards’
voting records about monetary policy rates in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. In contrast to previous studies, we
consider about 25 different macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psy-
chological or preference-related factors jointly and deal formally with the
attendant model uncertainty using Bayesian model averaging. We find
that the rate of dissent is between 5% and 20% in these central banks.
Our results suggest that most regressors, including those capturing the ef-
fect of inflation and output, are not robust determinants of voting dissent.
The difference in central bankers’ preferences is likely to drive the dissent
in the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England. For the Czech and Hungarian
central banks, average dissent tends to be larger when policy rates are
changed. Some evidence is also found that food price volatility tends to
increase the voting dissent in the U.S. Fed and in Riksbank.
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1 Introduction
Central bankers often have to take difficult policy decisions that cannot be
guided fully by available models and simple policy rules and that have to rely on
intuition and judgment of individual central bankers (ECB, 2006). It is therefore
not unusual to observe dissent when central bankers vote about monetary policy
rates. Especially in times of high uncertainty such as during the recent global
financial crisis, opinions about appropriate policy measures may differ sharply.
On the one hand, some authors (Issing, 1999) claim that consensual deci-
sions may be superior to those obtained by a majority voting because their
communication is easier and they anchor expectations better. In addition, con-
sensual decisions reduce political pressures. On the other hand, other studies
(Blinder and Morgan, 2005) illustrate that decisions taken by a group of inde-
pendent individuals are superior to other decisions. Moreover, several studies
(see Gerlach-Kristen, 2004, and Horvath et al., 2010, among others) indicate
that a degree of disagreement provides a very useful information about future
policy moves. It follows that disagreement among central bankers can be viewed
as a useful part of monetary policy practices.
It is therefore surprising that we know relatively little about whether mon-
etary policy decisions around the globe are taken consensually or not and also
very little about major factors driving dissent among central bankers. Obvi-
ously, one reason for the lack of knowledge about these issues is that most
central banks do not release voting records from their monetary policy meet-
ings. Another reason is that existing literature focuses only on selected central
banks (typically the U.S. and U.K.) and investigates rather narrow set of pos-
sible determinants. Our ambition is to contribute to this small, but growing
literature and examine many factors jointly that can in principle contribute to
voting dissent.
In comparison to the existing literature, we examine more central banks to
give richer international perspective to our research and analyze the determi-
nants of dissent using the voting records for central banks in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. These central banks display a different
rate of dissent. While we find that the dissent rate for U.S. Fed is well below
5%, the dissent rate in the Bank of England and Riksbank is around 10% in our
sample and the rate of dissent in Czech and Hungarian central banks reaches
15% and 20%, respectively.
On the top of that, since the literature does not give unequivocal theoretical
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model for central bankers’ dissent behavior, we deal formally with the model un-
certainty to understand the robustness of the results on voting dissent in a fuller
manner. One major issue is that previous literature does not reach consensus
whether the voting behavior is not unanimous because of the heterogeneity in
preferences of central bankers, the heterogeneity in information sets of central
bankers, or both.
For this reason, we employ Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to analyze
rigorously to what extent various macroeconomic, financial, institutional, psy-
chological or preference-related factors (together about 25 different regressors)
contribute to voting dissent. One of additional benefits of BMA for applied
work is that it gives the posterior inclusion probability for each regressor (e.g.
the “probability that given regressor should be included in the correct model of
voting dissent”) and therefore, allows ranking of various factors affecting the dis-
sent according to their marginal importance. In consequence, we may pinpoint
what type of factors typically make the central bankers disagree. In contrast
to previous literature, which focused on the internal-external distinction, career
backgrounds or other institutional characteristics, we also examine the role of
macroeconomic and financial factors.
In addition, BMA allows us examining jointly the importance of factors,
which are typically highly collinear such as inflation, inflation squared, inflation
forecast or the deviation of inflation from inflation target.1 For example, the
empirical literature on the monetary policy rules often discusses, which of the
aforementioned variables are appropriate for modelling central banks’ interest
rate setting. Our analysis may in principle shed light on this issue by examining,
which of these variables matter more for voting dissent.
Our results suggest that only a few regressors are robust determinants of
voting dissent. Even though the regressors exhibit the expected coefficient sign,
their posterior inclusion probability is rather low. This includes some ’tradi-
tional’ determinants such as those related to inflation or output. In addition, the
determinants of dissent with high posterior inclusion probability are country–
specific, to a certain extent. For the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England, we find
that difference in central bankers’ preferences is likely to be behind different
voting record of individual board members. The results suggest that changing
policy rate triggers more dissent in Czech and Hungarian central banks. This
1See Hoeting et al. (1999) for underlying statistical theory. Montgemery and Nyhan
(2010) provide an example in political science, how BMA can be useful in distinguishing the
importance of collinear factors in explaining civil wars.
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indicates that different board members give different weight to a new signal
about the change in unobserved optimal policy rate. In addition, food price
volatility is one of the robust determinants of voting dissent in the U.S. Fed and
Riksbank.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of
related literature. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 introduces Bayesian
model averaging. Section 5 gives the empirical results. Conclusions are available
in section 6.
2 Related Literature
We briefly survey literature relevant to a question of whether and why members
of a monetary policy committee might differ in their opinion about appropriate
course of monetary policy.
To start with there is a large literature in social psychology documenting
conformity induced by the fact that a person belongs to a group (Cialdini and
Goldstein 2004, Baumeister and Vohs, 2007). Usual explanation of the confor-
mity is then either informational influence among the group members or fear
of potentially dissenting member of being left out or looked upon negatively
by other group members (Brown 2000, chapter 4). In this respect, Berk et al.
(2010) find that the differences in voting behavior of internal and external Bank
of England’s MPC members occur not earlier than after three years in the office.
Still, differences among the monetary decision makers can be given either
by their different preferences or by different information they posses. And even
with the latter being the same dissent can arise due to a different interpretation
of the shared information.
Indeed, there is a large literature documenting different preferences on the
part of monetary decision makers. One strand of literature looks at the Bank of
England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and finds differences among mem-
bers coming from within the bank (insiders) and those coming from outside the
bank (outsiders) (Bhattacharjee and Holly 2006, 2010, Gerlach-Kristen 2003,
Harris and Spencer, 2009, Harris et al., 2011, Hansen and McMahon 2011).
On the other hand, Besley et al. (2008) document little differences between
insiders and outsiders (and academic versus non-academic and treasury versus
non-treasury members) claiming that the observed individual heterogeneity is
driven by personal characteristics unrelated to membership in any of the men-
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tioned categories. Interestingly, Besley et al. (2008) also find that a level of
disagreement in the MPC is significantly lower immediately after any policy
change.
Another strand of literature showing differences in preferences focuses on the
US Federal Reserve Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) (Chappell et al.,
1997, Chappell and McGregor, 2000, Chappell et al., 2004, 2005). Typically, the
differences are documented via different intercepts of estimated individual reac-
tion functions. Those differences can be further explained by different regional
affiliation of the FOMC members (Chappell et al. 2008, Meade and Sheets
2005).
But evidence suggesting that it is different information or different interpre-
tation of the same information that is driving heterogeneous opinions is also rel-
atively easy to find. For example, for FOMC Chappel, McGregor and Vermilyea
(2005) provide evidence of not only different intercepts of individual reaction
functions, but also of different strength of reaction to economic variables by the
FOMC members.
Finally, higher disagreement can be driven simply by a larger committee
size and hence purely mechanically. Then any variable with an influence on the
committee size will influence disagreement as well. In this respect, Erhart and
Vasquez-Paz (2007) in their survey of central bank decision making committees
show that countries with larger and more volatile GDP, larger population and
larger inflation volatility have larger central bank boards. Berger et al. (2008)
find that the countries with more democratic institutions and more independent
central bank tend to have larger boards. Berk and Beirut (2011) model the
benefits and costs of committee decision-making in central banks and show
that communication helps disseminate the knowledge among board members
and may effectively work as a substitute to expanding the size of a committee.
Horvath et al. (2010) find that different voting protocols (or voting systems)
influence the frequency of voting dissent. The democratic voting protocol under
which the board members express individualistically their preferences typically
generates the higher frequency of voting dissent.
In addition, publicity of debate may decrease the incentives to dissent.
Meade and Stasavage (2008) find that once FOMC of the U.S. Fed decided to be-
gin releasing transcripts, the level of dissent has decreased. Meade (2010) adds
that the dissent for FOMC members representing larger Fed districts decreased
more. As a consequence, this stream of research highlights the importance of
institutional factors.
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Overall, the literature mentioned above suggests that each monetary policy
committee should, due to individual differences, have its baseline disagreement
rate. This baseline should be to a certain extent but not fully determined by
the size of the committee and different individual preferences that can in fact be
a reason for being elected a committee member.. Actual disagreement during a
specific meeting should then be determined from the baseline as a function of the
time the committee has remained the same, as a function of current economic
variables and as a function of previous decision.
3 Data
First, we describe the voting dissent data. Second, we give details on the con-
struction of our explanatory variables. The voting record data are collected
from the minutes of monetary policy meetings and are freely available on the
websites of respective central banks.2 The source of other data is the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics and Eurostat.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the prevalence of voting dis-
sent in the U.S. Fed, Bank of England (BoE), Riksbank, Czech National Bank
(CNB) and Hungarian National Bank (MNB). The total number of votes varies
from 554 (for the Riksbank) to 2016 (for U.S. Fed). This reflects not only dif-
ferent time coverage, but also a different number of board members as well as
different frequency of monetary policy meetings. The institutional background
for monetary policy decisions in these central banks is extensively discussed in
Horvath et al. (2010).
We find that the rate of dissent varies across the central banks. It is lowest
for the U.S. Fed, which records the rate of dissent of less than 5%. This is likely
to be a consequence of voting protocol under Greenspan chairmanship with a
low level of dissent. This trend continued under Bernanke chairmanship during
the financial crisis. On the other hand, the Czech and Hungarian central banks
exhibit the highest dissent rate (15% and 20%, respectively). This likely follows
from individualistic voting protocol of these two central banks as well as from
a higher number of board members in case of the Hungarian central bank (the
average of present board members above 10 in our sample). Interestingly, the
rate of dissent in the Czech and Hungarian central banks almost doubles at
the policy meetings, when the rates are changed. In addition, the Czech and
2We plan to post our data on the website of Central Bank Communication Network,
http://www.central-bank-communication.net/, to be freely used by other researchers.
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Table 1: Dissent in Monetary Policy Committees, Descriptive Statistics
Central Bank FED BoE Riksbank CNB MNB
Total number of votes 2016 1336 554 897 577
Majority votes 1919 1157 509 762 463
% of total 95.2% 86.6% 91.9% 84.9% 80.2%
Total number of dissents 97 179 45 135 114
% dissents of total 4.8% 13.4% 8.1% 15.1% 19.8%
Dissents to lower rates 30 101 22 62 74
% lower rates of dissents 30.9% 56.4% 48.9% 45.9% 64.9%
Dissents to higher rates 67 78 23 75 40
% higher rates of dissents 69.1% 43.6% 51.1% 54.1% 35.1%
Average dissents - IR changed 0.53 1.11 0.47 1.64 2.67
Average dissents - IR not changed 0.52 1.21 0.47 0.58 1.81
Avg. number of present board members 10.9 8.8 5.8 6.3 10.9
Dissenting governor (no. of meetings) 0 2 0 0 5
Sample 1987:8– 1997:6– 1999:1– 1998:1– 2005:10–
2009:12 2009:12 2009:12 2009:12 2009:12
Hungarian central banks do not only display a greater degree of voting dissent,
but the higher number of dissenting members is not uncommon, as Figure 1
indicates. The dissent for higher and lower rates is equally frequent in the
Riksbank and Czech National Bank, and in the Bank of England, to a certain
degree. On the other hand, dissenting for higher rates is much more common in
the U.S. Fed, while dissents for lower rates occur more frequently in Hungarian
National Bank.
Next, Figure 2 gives a list of our explanatory variables. All in all, we consider
25 different variables. With some level of simplification, we may divide them
into four categories: economic factors, psychological factors, institutional factors
and preference related factors.
Economic factors
• It may be more difficult for board members to agree when facing larger
uncertainty about inflation developments. Fast reaction to shocks triggers
trade-offs for secondary targets such as financial stability or employment
and slow reaction is costly in terms of target credibility. The nature of
shocks also play a role, while supply shocks typically call for mild response,
demand shocks may be a reason for aggressive policy. We capture the un-
certainty about inflation developments by several closely related variables:
current inflation change, inflation squared, future inflation and difference
7
Figure 1: The Frequency of Dissent
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of current inflation from the target. These variables are considerably cor-
related, but as we explain in the following section, BMA methodology
deals with this issue by assigning different weight to different regression
models.
• Board members may have different views on monetary policy transmis-
sion (alternative to using output gap as a dominant indicator are mone-
tary indicators approximated by money gap and open economy indicators
approximated by real exchange rate gap). It is difficult to agree if alter-
native indicators point in different directions, as different implicit models
matter. To gauge these effects, we analyze whether industrial production
growth, industrial production gap squared, unemployment rate, unem-
ployment gap, money growth, money gap squared, exchange rate change
and exchange rate gap squared matter for the voting dissent.
• Board members may deal with multiple targets, e.g. with secondary tar-
gets such as financial stability or economic growth approximated by finan-
cial stress index and output gap, respectively. It is difficult to agree how
to set interest rates when primary target – price stability – conflicts with
secondary ones. For this reason, in addition to the aforementioned mea-
sures of economic activity, we also include a comprehensive financial stress
index recently developed by the International Monetary Fund (Cardarelli
et al., 2011).
• Board members face supply side shocks, which we approximate by oil
prices and food prices. It may be more difficult to agree how to react
to this type of shocks. The opinions of board members may differ not
only about the extent of second-round effects (e.g. to what extent original
supply side shock will feed into demand shocks later on), but also on to
what extent they wish to tolerate temporary deviation of actual inflation
from the inflation target. The deviation may have a negative consequences
for central bank credibility.
Psychological factors
• Psychological literature emphasizes that it is easier to dissent, if board
member is not newcomer (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004, Baumeister and
Vohs, 2007). Therefore, we include team duration as the additional ex-
planatory variable and expect a positive correlation between team dura-
tion and dissent.
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• The dissenting governor may induce, given her or his leadership, other
members to dissent from majority, too. On the one hand, we could intro-
duce the dummy for dissenting governor and examine its effect. On the
other hand, it is clear that this effect would be at least in part mechanical,
as governor is a member of the board. This issue is further complicated
by the fact that central banks do not disclose the order in which individ-
ual board members vote. If the governor votes as the last one, it is not
clear whether she or he can induce other members to dissent. On the top
of that, the governors dissent very rarely. The governors never dissented
during our sample period in the central banks in the U.S., Czech Republic
and Sweden, see Table 1. They dissented twice in the case of the Bank of
England and five times in the case of Hungarian National Bank. For this
reason, we decided not to include the dummy for dissenting governor in
our set of regressors.
Institutional factors
• Individualistic voting protocols may induce more dissent (Horvath et al.,
2010). Voting protocols may change with new governor and therefore, the
dummy for the change in governor post is introduced.3
• The probability that at least one members dissent is higher in larger
boards. Therefore, larger central bank boards may mechanically induce
more dissent (Erhart and Vasquez-Paz, 2007). For this reason, we include
the number of board members present at the monetary policy meeting.
Interestingly, the absence at the monetary policy meetings is relatively
common. Clearly, board members may be absent because of sickness, but
also because they are obliged to represent their bank at the meetings with
international organizations such as the European Union or International
Monetary Fund.
Preferences
• The board members may also disagree about the right time to change the
policy rates even if they possess the same information about economic
environment. Some board members may rush to change the rates, others
3The dummy is perfectly collinear with the variable team and therefore, it is possible to
include it only in the case of U.S. Fed. Our sample period covers Greenspan and Bernanke
chairmanships and therefore, only one dummy variable is introduced.
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may be more cautious. For this reason, we include the dummy for pol-
icy rate change as well as for dummy for future policy rate change and
dummy for lagged policy rate change. Similarly, the board members may
be more cautious about policy reversals (i.e. about changing the interest
rate trend).
• Controlling for other relevant factors, board members may exhibit higher
dissent rate in case their preferences differ more sharply. To proxy for this
effect, we create the dummies for each bank board team. For example,
the teams change on at least a yearly basis in the U.S. Fed due to rotating
system of regional Fed presidents.
4 Bayesian Model Averaging
This section presents a brief introduction of BMA (see (Koop, 2003, and Koop
et al., 2007, and references therein). The BMA is typically employed to evaluate
rigorously the robustness of results especially in the environment of model un-
certainty and many possible regressors. It has been typically applied to analyze
the determinants of long-term economic growth (see Fernandez et al., 2001a,
Fernandez et al., 2001b, Feldkircher and Zeugner (2009), Ley and Steel (2009)
or Eicher et al., 2011, among others) and so far much less in the other areas of
economic research.
Assume we have a dependent variable Y (the share of dissenting votes) with
a number of observations n and k regressors X1.....Xk (the list of our regressors
is available in Table 2). Often it is the case that the theory does not give a
guidance, which regressors X1.....Xk should be included in the regression model.
Typically, the baseline model with a subset of regressors X1.....Xk is chosen and
additional regressors within the set of X1.....Xk are subsequently included to
assess the robustness of baseline model. However, in many applications, the
choice of baseline model and models for sensitivity analysis is done in ad hoc
manner. In addition, this procedure is prone to overstate the true significance
of regression coefficients as well as to suffer from omitted variable bias. The
BMA deals rigorously with aforementioned issues and is defined as follows.
Assume that our model of interest is Y = α1X1 + .. + αkXk + e, where
e ∼ N(0, σ2I) (assume for simplicity that X1 is a constant). Y represents
the rate of dissent (the fraction of dissenting members over the total present
members at monetary policy meeting), X1.....Xk are our explanatory variables
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capturing various economic, institutional, psychological and preference related
factors. In principle, there are l = 2k subsets of X’s that can be considered as
regressors and therefore M1....Ml regression models to be estimated.
Let us denote the vector of parameters of i-th model as θi = (α, σ) . The
likelihood function of i-th model, pr (D | θi,Mi), summarizes all the information
about θi based on available data D. The marginal likelihood, the probability
density of the data, D, conditional on Mi can be written as follows
pr (D |Mi) =
ˆ
pr (D | θi,Mi) pr (θi |Mi) dθi, (1)
the marginal likelihood is therefore a product of the likelihood function
pr (D | θi,Mi) and prior density pr (θi |Mi) integrated over the parameter space.
Using pr (D |Mi) one can derive the prior probability thatMi is a correct model,
which we denote as pr (Mi). Using Bayes’s theorem, we receive the posterior
model probability of Mi, pr (Mi | D).
pr (Mi | D)= pr (D | θi,Mi) pr (Mi)∑i
l=1 pr (D |Ml) pr (Ml)
(2)
The posterior inclusion probability of given regressor, pr (αj 6= 0 | D), is then
obtained by taking a sum of posterior model probabilities across those models
that include the regressor. Posterior inclusion probability is of central impor-
tance here, since it measures the probability that given regressor belongs to the
“correct” model.
Since the model space is typically extremely large, MC3 algorithm is used to
approximate the posterior distribution of model space by simulating a sample
from it. It is computationally prohibitive to evaluate all the possible models4 and
we use MC3 algorithm developed by Madigan and York (1995) to approximate
the posterior distribution of model space. In this regard, we use at least 1 000
000 burn-ins and 3 000 000 draws, which typically leads to a sufficiently high
correlation (the value above 0.99) between analytical and MC3 posterior model
probabilities. In some cases, we have to use 5 000 000 burn-ins and 5 000 000
draws (in the case of U.S. Fed) to obtain the correlation about 0.99.
4For example, the number of regression models for the U.S. Fed is 247, i.e. more than 140
trillion of regressions to be estimated.
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The parameter priors have to be specified before implementing BMA. We
use the Unit Information Prior (UIP), since it is commonly used and performs
well in forecasting exercises (Eicher et al., 2011, and Ley and Steel, 2009). The
UIP is defined as follows.
pr (D |Mi) ≈ c− 1/2BICi, (3)
where
BICi = n log
(
1−R2i
)
+ pi log (n) (4)
In (3) and (4), c is a constant, R2i stands the coefficient of determination
and pi for the number of regressors. This prior is typically labeled as UIP.
As for the model prior, we use a uniform model prior, which gives equal
prior probability to all modelsMi. In consequence, pr (Mi)=1/L for each i. We
choose the uniform model prior, because it is commonly used in the empirical
exercises, when it is not clear whether some regression model is preferable to
the other, which is also our case. In addition, Eicher et al. (2011) show that it
performs well in forecasting exercises.
5 Results
This section presents our regression results. We use the BMA to assess the
robustness of the effect of economic, institutional, psychological and preference
factors on the extent of voting dissent. The results are available in Tables 3-7.
The tables present posterior inclusion probability and posterior mean for each
regressor.5
BMA estimates for the U.S. Fed are reported in Table 3. In general, the
posterior inclusion probability for all economic regressors is low. This suggests
that economic factors are unlikely to have an effect of the voting dissent rate.
The exemption is food_gap_sq (calculated as the difference between actual
food prices and HP-filtered food prices squared) with the PIP of 0.7.6 The sign
of posterior mean is positive suggesting that the deviation of food prices from
5Conditional posterior sign is not presented for the sake of brevity, but these results are
available from the authors upon request.
6Raftery (1995) puts forward that PIP must be greater than 0.5 to be considered as effective
determinant of regressand.
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Table 3: What Determines Dissent? BMA Results for the U.S. Fed
Variable PIP Post M Post SD Variable PIP Post M Post SD
inf_change 0.01 0.04 1.56 team1 0.03 0.80 6.89
inf_gap_sq 0.02 0.00 0.40 team2 0.89 75.34 36.15
inf_sq 0.20 0.43 0.96 team3 0.83 68.94 39.38
inf_forecast 0.03 -0.03 1.41 team4 0.81 66.01 39.07
ip_growth 0.01 1.82 94.03 team5 0.02 -0.07 3.86
ip_gap_sq 0.02 -182 2390 team6 0.92 74.97 32.19
u_change 0.02 -0.17 2.37 team7 0.23 10.93 22.82
u_gap_sq 0.02 -2.90 78.97 team8 0.08 3.01 12.36
m_growth 0.03 -52.92 390.77 team9 0.02 -0.11 3.11
m_gap_sq 0.14 -13204 38982 team10 0.02 -0.13 3.34
er_growth 0.02 -1.15 40.88 team11 0.01 0.11 3.00
er_gap_sq 0.25 3224 6360 team12 0.13 5.33 16.31
oil_growth 0.03 -1.67 13.27 team13 0.01 -0.09 2.91
oil_gap_sq 0.02 0.57 16.72 team14 0.05 -1.62 8.89
food_growth 0.14 38.19 112.21 team15 0.02 -0.06 2.96
food_gap_sq 0.70 1351 1056 team16 0.02 -0.16 3.24
fsi 0.02 -0.01 0.24 team17 0.06 -2.70 12.81
governor_change 0.02 -0.03 1.93 team18 0.24 -13.08 26.85
ir_change_dummy 0.02 -0.15 1.84 team19 0.03 -0.61 5.48
lag_rate_change 0.36 -16.16 25.52 team20 0.02 0.46 4.69
fut_rate_change 0.16 6.98 18.84 team21 0.01 0.02 2.67
policy_reversal 0.02 -0.33 3.66 team22 0.03 0.44 8.11
no_members 0.16 2.55 6.91 team23 0.04 -1.04 7.51
team_duration 0.04 0.10 0.63
Note: PIP, Post M and Post SD stand for the posterior inclusion probability, posterior mean
and posterior standard deviation, respectively. For convenience, posterior means and standard
deviations multiplied by 1000. PIP > .5 in bold. The abbreviations of regressors are explained
in Table 2.
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Table 4: What Determines Dissent? BMA Results for the Bank of England
Variable PIP Post M Post SD Variable PIP Post M Post SD
inf_change 0.31 26.84 46.14 policy_reversal 0.03 1.14 10.85
inf_gap_sq 0.09 1.11 4.64 no_members 0.06 1.32 7.01
inf_sq 0.19 1.39 3.40 team_duration 0.03 -0.03 0.38
inf_forecast 0.03 -0.04 3.16 team2 0.09 -10.11 38.98
ip_growth 0.02 3.64 182.32 team3 1.00 124.96 37.54
ip_gap_sq 0.04 853 10532 team4 0.02 0.22 6.34
u_change 0.06 26.27 147.59 team5 0.95 202.45 84.87
u_gap_sq 0.03 -32.46 565.53 team6 0.10 7.34 26.77
m_growth 0.06 -0.14 0.74 team7 0.03 0.56 7.26
m_gap_sq 0.03 -1236 12041 team8 0.03 -1.75 15.41
er_growth 0.03 14.04 144.95 team9 0.94 135.89 57.32
er_gap_sq 0.07 653 3214 team10 0.06 -2.06 11.33
oil_prices_growth 0.02 -0.29 19.48 team11 0.05 2.55 16.14
oil_prices_gap_sq 0.03 0.61 37.29 team12 0.03 0.93 12.34
food_prices_growth 0.26 209 408 team13 0.02 -0.54 11.88
food_prices_gap_sq 0.03 9.74 210 team14 0.31 20.77 35.73
fsi 0.40 -3.38 5.00 team15 0.06 5.44 31.67
ir_change_dummy 0.02 0.00 3.60 team16 0.08 -8.37 37.10
lag_rate_change 0.03 -0.43 11.03 team17 0.06 -6.27 31.03
fut_rate_change 0.07 -5.57 28.66 team18 0.05 -4.71 29.27
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 3.
Table 5: What Determines Dissent? BMA Results for the Swedish Riksbank
Variable PIP Post M Post SD Variable PIP Post M Post SD
inf_change 0.39 -29.85 4.47 food_prices_growth 0.56 542 58.02
inf_gap_sq 0.12 1.06 0.37 food_prices_gap_sq 0.04 -11.58 33.83
inf_sq 0.29 2.02 0.38 fsi 0.06 0.24 0.20
inf_forecast 0.04 0.09 0.29 ir_change_dummy 0.06 -1.05 0.89
ip_growth 0.04 -2.85 15.05 lag_rate_change 0.04 0.56 1.20
ip_gap_sq 0.06 512 346 fut_rate_change 0.09 5.75 2.54
u_change 0.04 -0.44 0.51 policy_reversal 0.04 -0.88 1.25
u_gap_sq 0.11 -75.81 27.58 no_members 0.05 -0.82 0.75
m_growth 0.10 -102 40.44 team_duration 0.19 0.66 0.17
m_gap_sq 0.44 -26525 3589 team2 0.04 0.25 0.80
er_growth 0.04 12.18 21.77 team3 0.05 -1.16 0.90
er_gap_sq 0.07 681 399 team4 0.05 -0.95 1.10
oil_prices_growth 0.16 -38.60 11.03 team5 0.05 0.18 1.20
oil_prices_gap_sq 0.07 -15.33 8.35 team6 0.12 10.60 3.71
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 3.
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Table 6: What Determines Dissent? BMA Results for the Czech National Bank
Variable PIP Post M Post SD Variable PIP Post M Post SD
inf_change 0.05 0.60 7.02 food_prices_gap_sq 0.07 97.24 546
inf_gap_sq 0.14 0.40 1.25 fsi 0.07 0.80 4.64
inf_sq 0.05 0.02 0.24 ir_change_dummy 1.00 156.61 29.76
inf_forecast 0.05 -0.19 2.35 lag_rate_change 0.05 0.27 15.79
ip_growth 0.30 296 535 fut_rate_change 0.07 -3.25 23.46
ip_gap_sq 0.04 -35.17 1617 policy_reversal 0.15 -13.97 41.42
u_change 0.10 -5.65 22.06 no_members 0.05 0.51 4.24
u_gap_sq 0.06 77.49 483 team_duration 0.04 0.00 0.21
m_growth 0.06 -49.56 356 team2 0.33 -39.01 67.16
m_gap_sq 0.41 41887 59624 team3 0.05 -0.84 9.91
er_growth 0.06 -34.21 233 team4 0.04 0.18 6.03
er_gap_sq 0.05 136 1880 team5 0.04 0.06 7.64
oil_prices_growth 0.04 2.48 34.22 team6 0.14 9.37 29.20
oil_prices_gap_sq 0.07 -13.80 82.01 team7 0.06 1.98 14.21
food_prices_growth 0.04 0.01 108
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 3.
Table 7: What Determines Dissent? BMA Results for the Hungarian National
Bank
Variable PIP Post M Post SD Variable PIP Post M Post SD
inf_change 0.04 0.26 7.75 oil_prices_gap_sq 0.16 84.62 263
inf_gap_sq 0.36 0.35 6.83 food_prices_growth 0.33 334 585
inf_sq 0.60 2.23 3.34 food_prices_gap_sq 0.06 68.73 511
inf_forecast 0.07 -0.22 3.61 fsi 0.12 1.01 4.32
ip_growth 0.05 -10.57 183 ir_change_dummy 0.78 90.65 63.91
ip_gap_sq 0.15 -1932.90 5989 lag_rate_change 0.06 1.62 12.80
u_change 0.05 2.47 24.41 fut_rate_change 0.27 -22.50 45.10
u_gap_sq 0.09 -793.39 3685 policy_reversal 0.06 -3.35 29.63
m_growth 0.06 67.13 435 no_members 0.62 -18.57 17.83
m_gap_sq 0.06 1861.85 14660 team_duration 0.07 0.22 1.29
er_growth 0.05 -15.51 227 team2 0.08 -7.84 42.59
er_gap_sq 0.19 -1907.47 4977 team3 0.19 -35.34 90.51
oil_prices_growth 0.07 -13.77 98.73 team4 0.32 33.94 59.22
Note: For mnemonics, see Table 3.
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its trend is more likely to deliver opposing views about appropriate course of
monetary policy.
Similarly, the effect of institutional and psychological factors seems to be
limited for the U.S. Fed. On the other hand, team2, team3, team4 and
team6 exhibit very high PIP above 0.8. As a consequence, it gives some indirect
evidence that dissenting behavior is more likely observed due to differences in
preferences. This broadly corresponds to previous findings by Besley et al.
(2008) and Harris et al. (2011), who stress that the unobserved heterogeneity
among central bankers is the cause behind the dissent.
The results for the Bank of England resemble those of the U.S. Fed, to a
certain degree. team3 and team9 display a high PIP, but the PIP for the food
prices is lower. Interestingly, there is some weak evidence that higher financial
stress (fsi) is associated with less dissent.
The results for Swedish Riksbank also indicate that economic factors are
typically not a robust determinant of dissent in voting behavior of their man-
agement. As for the U.S. Fed, there is a certain evidence that the greater
volatility of food prices is more likely to result in more frequent dissenting be-
havior. The institutional as well as psychological factors seem to be relatively
unimportant.
The results for the Czech and Hungarian central banks indicate that aver-
age dissent tends to be larger when policy rates are changed, while meetings
confirming interest rate level are characterized by smaller dissents. According
to this result, changes in policy rates are more difficult for boards. As for the
Czech National Bank, there is some weak evidence that the deviation of money
growth (m_gap_sq) from its trend is associated with more dissent. This sug-
gests that it is somewhat more difficult to agree when alternative indicators such
as money growth point in different directions than the baseline models typically
based on some measure of output gap. The number of present members at the
Hungarian central bank seems to matter for dissent, too, but surprisingly we
do not find that the larger boards necessarily deliver more dissent. Neverthe-
less, the results for the Czech and Hungarian central banks show that economic
and psychological factors do not play a role for dissent. There is some evidence
that the institutional structure of decision making is behind the central bankers’
dissent.
All in all, the BMA results for our set of five central banks suggest that the
determinants of dissent are country-specific, to a certain degree, and that there
are a few regressors with the robust effect on the dissent.
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6 Conclusions
We examine the voting behavior of central bank board members. We use the
data for the U.S. Fed, Bank of England, Swedish Riksbank, Czech National Bank
and Hungarian National Bank. More specifically, we investigate which factors
cause individual central bankers to dissent from the majority. Unlike previous
research in this area, our ambition is to examine many possible factors jointly
and uncover whether some particular factors (such as economic, institutional,
psychological or preference-related) are more important than the others. For this
reason, we collect 25 possible determinants of dissent for our 5 central banks
to shed the light on this issue. Since the theoretical literature does not give a
clear guidance about which model should be empirically tested, we employ the
Bayesian model averaging to deal with model uncertainty formally.
Our results suggest that only a few regressors are robust determinants of
voting dissent. Even though the regressors exhibit expected coefficient sign,
their posterior inclusion probability is rather low. This suggest that they are
unlikely to be robustly associated with the voting dissent in our set of central
banks. Our results indicate that economic factors typically do not play a role.
This includes some ’traditional’ determinants such as those related to inflation
or output. The exception is the volatility of food prices, which increases voting
dissent in the U.S. Fed and Riksbank in a robust manner. We also find that
psychological factors proxied by the team duration (to capture the hypothesis
that new members are less likely to dissent) and the dummy for dissenting
governor (to capture the hypothesis that it is more difficult to disagree with
leader) do not drive dissent.
For the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England, we find that difference in central
bankers’ preferences is likely to be behind different voting record of individual
board members. The results for Czech and Hungarian central banks indicate
that it is more difficult decision to change the policy rates than to keep them
constant.
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